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Abstract 
Vulnerability detection and safety of smart contracts are of paramount importance because of their 
immutable nature. Symbolic tools like OYENTE and MAIAN are typically used for vulnerability 
prediction in smart contracts. As these tools are computationally expensive, they are typically used 
to detect vulnerabilities until some predefined invocation depth. These tools require more search time 
as the invocation depth increases. Since the number of smart contracts is increasing exponentially, it 
is difficult to analyze the contracts using these traditional tools. Recently a machine learning 
technique called Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) has been used for binary classification, i.e., to 
predict whether a smart contract is vulnerable or not. This technique requires nearly constant search 
time as the invocation depth increases. In the present article, we have shown a multi-class 
classification, where we classify a smart contract in Suicidal, Prodigal, Greedy, or Normal categories. 
We used Average Stochastic Gradient Descent Weight-Dropped LSTM (AWD-LSTM), which is a 
variant of LSTM, to perform classification. We reduced the class imbalance (a large number of 
normal contracts as compared to other categories) by considering only the distinct opcode 
combination for normal contracts. We have achieved a weighted average Fbeta score of 90.0%. Hence, 
such techniques can be used to analyze a large number of smart contracts and help to improve the 
security of these contracts. 
Keywords: Machine learning, Smart contracts, LSTM, AWD-LSTM, Suicidal, Prodigal, Greedy, 
Classification, Invocation depth 
1. Introduction 
“Smart contract” (SC), a term coined by Nick Szabo in 1996[1], is an extended idea of a bitcoin 
blockchain and consists of a bunch of promises which should be executed during transactions between 
mutually distrusted nodes without the mediation of any centralized trusted authority. Therefore, a 
smart contract is an auto executable digital technological solution, which has the potential to augment, 
expedite, and enhance efficacies of traditional legal contracts. While the sanctity of a traditional legal 
contract is ensured by institutions of law and enforcement agencies, none of them is a critical 
requirement for SCs, therefore significantly reducing the complexity by technological interventions. 
It eliminates the need for third-party entities to handle how contractual agreements (or disagreements) 
need to be played out between two or more parties. In real life, a vending machine is the best example 
of a smart contract. It eliminates the need for a shopkeeper who counts the money given by the buyer 
and gives the desired product. So here, only two parties are involved, the buyer and the vending 
machine. In SCs, the transaction between two parties is encoded in a computer code, typically using 
Contract Oriented Language (COL), which will be discussed in section 1.1. Recently, many platforms 
have also been used for writing smart contracts like Ethereum and Rootstock (RSK) [2-3]. The 
contracts for Ethereum are written in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) and programmed through 
a language called Solidity [4]. As these smart contracts hold virtual coins worth thousands of USD 
each, their safety is of paramount importance. There are some security challenges in smart contracts. 
First, they cannot be upgraded or patched like other traditional consumer device software after their 
deployment. Second, contracts are relatively difficult to test because of repeated invocations of 
transactions. Third, since the blockchain is dealing with cryptocurrencies worth billions of USD, they 
are more likely to be exploited by implanting bugs in contracts by attackers. There are few incidences 
of such exploitations of smart contracts. For example, in June 2016, a decentralized investment fund 
named DAO (Decentralised Autonomous Organisation) lost approximately $70 million due to the 
stealing of over 3.6 million Ether (virtual coin used by Ethereum) [5]. In November 2017, a security 
alert was issued by Parity Technologies, saying that their parity wallet (multi-sig wallets) was affected 
due to which $300 million was frozen [6]. To understand and predict such important vulnerabilities, 
we are resorting to the field of machine learning. Due to the ever increasing availability of high 
computational capabilities, machine learning methods are becoming a popular choice in analyzing 
data from different fields, such as analysing bio-medical image scans[7-8], Satellite images[9], 
materials characterization [10-11], share market[12], etc. There are several examples of the adoption 
of machine learning tools for different types of security attack detection. Dou et al. [13] used a deep 
LSTM model for anomaly detection in systems. Similarly, Shen et al. [14] used Recurrent Neural 
Network (RNN) having a sequence memory architecture for forecasting security events on a 
computer. Shin et al. [15] used LSTM for the identification of functions in binaries. These examples 
indicate that machine learning tools can be used to understand and improve the functioning of these 
cryptocurrency-based transactions. Let us discuss briefly some important ideas which will be useful 
in understanding the machine learning and smart contract fields together.   
1.1 Contract Oriented Language (COL) 
Contract oriented languages are used to write smart contracts involving various cryptocurrencies. The 
first COL, which is known as "Solidity," was developed by Gavin Wood, Christian Reitwiessner, 
Yoichi Hirai, and several of Ethereum’s core contributors for writing smart contracts that are 
functioned on Ether [16]. Presently Solidity has worldwide more than 200,000 developers [17]. 
Similarly, Golang is another very popular COL. It has worldwide more than 800,000 developers, 
primarily because it is an open-source programming language loosely based on the syntax of the C 
programming language. The other COLs used for writing SCs includes JavaScript, C++, Java, SQL, 
FLETA, SQP, etc. 
1.2 Opcode 
Let us try to illustrate the concept of opcode by an analogy. In object-oriented programming (OOP), 
when we execute a computer program, it is converted into a binary representation. However, in COL, 
it is converted to bytecodes, which is nothing but the hexadecimal representation of the COL. The set 
of human-readable instructions that need to be executed in the SCs are known as opcodes.  For 
example, in Ethereum virtual machine, the maximum number of possible distinct opcodes is only 150 
[16]. All the opcodes have their hexadecimal counterparts, for example, “AND” is “0x16”, “SDIV” 
is “0x05", “ADD” is “0x01" …etc.  
There are several vulnerability detection methods in a smart contract [18,19]. Symbolic analysis, also 
known as automatic bug detection protocol, is currently the most widely used method for vulnerability 
detection. OYENTE [20, 21] and MAIAN [22,23] are the two most prominent tools employing these 
ideas. MAIAN is used to extract opcodes from the bytecodes. MAIAN also classifies the bytecodes 
and hence generates the labels required for training a neural network. The major drawback of these 
two tools is that, while testing a smart contract, it must be active. The other major drawback of 
MAIAN is that the accuracy is critically dependent on the “invocation depth," which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
1.3 Invocation depth 
When a user initiates a smart contract written in Solidity, the contract will be assigned a unique 
address and a state value. State value consists of many different fields such as Ether value, Gas points, 
private storage, and executable codes. Whenever we want to execute the SC, this address is used to 
point to this particular contract. We can do either of the two following things with a smart contract: 
running the content, or, retrieving the state information from it. It is important to note at this point is 
that, while the execution of the smart contract, the state value is modified, but during retrieval, this 
remains unchanged. "Invocation depth" refers to the number of times the SC is called for [23].  The 
accuracy of MAIAN is dependent on the invocation depth. It means that, if we have a large invocation 
depth, the vulnerability present at a later invocation might not be detectable using MAIAN. To further 
illustrate the point, let us consider a hypothetical scenario as following. Assume a particular smart 
contract has more than a hundred invocation depth. Since identifying the vulnerabilities through 
MAIAN is resource-intensive, we might consider terminating the effort after checking up to few tens 
(say, 50) invocation depth. However, it might be possible that the vulnerability exists at a later 
instance of invocation, which will remain undetected. Some works focused on detecting 
vulnerabilities in smart contracts across multiple invocations [24]. The significant advantage of using 
an opcode based technique is that the smart contract need not be active while testing. Another major 
benefit of this approach is that, though it still weakly depend on the invocation depth, by virtue of 
being less computationally intensive, a large number of invocation depth can be covered. Thereby 
increasing the likelihood of identifying the potential vulnerabilities, which might be embedded deep 
inside. There are primarily three types of vulnerabilities: (i) Type-1: Suicidal, (ii) Type-2: Prodigal, 
(iii) Type-3: Greedy [23, 25]. The brief description about these vulnerabilities are given below. 
Suicidal contracts : A smart contract often has a security fallback option using which the contract can 
be terminated by a trusted address. This option is enabled to tackle emergency situations such as loss 
of ether due to attacks or other malfunctioning of the contract. If this feature is not implemented 
properly, it poses a vulnerability where a contract can be killed by any address. Such contracts are 
called Suicidal.  
Prodigal contracts : Smart contracts that can send funds to arbitrary addresses are termed as Prodigal 
contracts. When under attack, the contracts can send funds to owners or to arbitrary addresses. 
Attackers can exploit this vulnerability and send Ether to their own accounts. 
Greedy contracts : A smart contract that cannot release Ether to any address are termed as Greedy 
contracts. These are further sub divided into two categories: a) contracts that accept Ether but lack 
the instructions to send funds and b) contracts that accept Ether and contain instructions to send funds, 
but unable to perform the task. 
2. METHODS 
2.1 Data pre-processing 
The SC data that is analyzed in this article is obtained from the Tann et al. work [25]. They sourced 
the original data from Google BigQuery and then removed  the false-positives present in it [23], 
because it is likely to influence the performance. They have used MAIAN to obtain the labels based 
on vulnerability categories, as well as to extract the opcodes from the bytecodes [16]. This dataset, 
after preprocessing has 892913 distinct addresses, labelled in five different types, based on the 
vulnerability categories as (i) Type-1: Suicidal, (ii) Type-2: Prodigal, (iii) Type-3: Greedy [23, 25] 
(iv) Type-4 normal SCs, and (v) Type-5: Prodigal and Greedy both (The brief description is given in 
Section 1.3). The number of SCs falls under these categories are 5801, 1461, 1207, 884273, and 171 
respectively. Out of this, we have selected the first four types (Type-1 to 4). We did not consider the 
SCs of Type 5 (therefore not considered for further processing) primarily because of the two 
following reasons: (i) Type-5 is a composite category and therefore we tried avoiding it in this concept 
paper, and (ii) having too few SCs in this category (only 171 when compared to 884273 for Type-4) 
will create huge class imbalance, which might be challenging to address even by the strategy that we 
adopted and this is discussed in the following. Thus we have processed 892742 SCs. As we can see 
that the negative cases (Type 4: normal SCs) are large in number as compared to the positive cases 
(Type 1-3: SCs with vulnerabilities). Therefore it posed the problem of class imbalance, which is a 
serious issue from the vulnerability identification viewpoint. The main reason behind this class 
imbalance is the presence of repeated opcode combinations. It means that, whenever there is a new 
invocation of the SC, the new address is appended, whereas the opcode combination remains 
unchanged. Therefore a single specific opcode combination will refer to multiple instances of 
addresses. In a general setting, these will be referred to as distinct SCs, whereas we need not treat 
them as different. We, therefore, can reduce the computational efforts in identifying the 
vulnerabilities by considering only the distinct combinations of the opcodes that truly represent 
distinct situations. It also has an added advantage of reducing the adverse class imbalance, thereby 
further improving the performance. To put the matter in perspective, while we had 892742 distinct 
addresses, there are only 34822 distinct opcodes combinations. However, to tackle the problem of 
class imbalance, we have used all the opcodes belonging to the vulnerable SCs and only the distinct 
opcodes for normal SCs. That is, we did not remove any opcode combinations for Type 1 to 3 (their 
number remained intact as 5801, 1461 and 1207 respectively). However, for Type 4 (normal category) 
out of the total 884273 opcode combinations, only the unique combinations which are 32408 were 
retained and all the duplicate ones deleted. So finally, we have analyzed 40,877 opcode combinations 
(Type-1 to 4 as 5801, 1461, 1207, and 32408, respectively).  
2.2 Model: AWD-LSTM        
The smart contract data is sequential data, where the input is an opcode sequence. Thus, among 
various machine learning models, we have used the Average Stochastic Gradient Descent  Weight-
Dropped Long Short-Term Memory (AWD-LSTM) model [26]. It is one of the most popular state-
of-the-art language models and has been widely used in natural language processing [27]. It is ideally 
suited for sequential data, where some remnant memory of previous constructions lingers to a later 
stage, which is a foundational characteristic feature of any natural language (and so also is the case 
for SCs). LSTM model has been applied on different squential data to solve different problems such 
as natural language processing (NLP) [28,29], speech recognition [30,31], machine translation 
[32,33], etc. Tann et al. [25] used a standard LSTM model [34,35], where the embeddings are 
initialized randomly at the beginning of training and are updated during training. This study did not 
make a distinction between different types of vulnerabilities and considered them all in a unified 
class. In essence, it, therefore, implemented a binary classification: either having a vulnerability or 
not. The present article, however, attempted a multi-class classification, thereby producing a richer 
and deeper insight about the SCs. Rather than using a standard LSTM model for classification, we 
used a combination of two networks. The first network is similar to a Language model used in NLP, 
where the target task is to predict the next word in a sentence. The second network performs 
classification using representations learned in the language model.  
An LSTM model uses only two distinct weight matrices, also known as embedding matrices which 
are learned during training of the neural network. The number of rows (say, m) of the embedding 
matrix facing the input layer should be identical to the number of vocabulary, while the number of 
columns (say, n) is, typically, a hyperparameter. The inputs are pre-processed in the form of ‘one hot 
vector’ [25] having length m. Therefore, after the multiplication of input vector and the embedding 
matrix, the output will be of size 1×n, which will be one of the three inputs for LSTM block. The 
other two inputs (the hidden state and the “memory” of previous block) typically are set to zero for 
the first LSTM block. An LSTM block consists of four main components : a) Forget gate b) Input 
gate c) Output gate and d) cell (memory) state. The cell state helps in passing information from one 
LSTM block to another while learning dependencies in long sequences. The forget gate removes the 
insignificant information from the cell state by multiplying it with a filter. It takes two inputs: hidden 
state from the previous time step and the input at the current time step. These inputs are multiplied 
by the weight matrices followed by a sigmoid activation function which gives output as a vector with 
values ranging from 0 to 1. If the output for a particular cell state is ‘0’, it means that  the forget gate 
wants the cell state to forget that piece of information completely. The input gate is responsible for 
adding new information to the cell state. The output gate helps in selecting relevant information from 
the current cell state. The lack of requirement of fixed shape helps to build neural network models on 
sequential data with variable length. It is proven to be suitable for tasks such as machine translation 
where both input and output can have variable length. The embedding matrix has a lot of contextual 
information about the smart contracts and hence a good embedding matrix is very crucial to achieve 
better performance. The specific strategy adopted in this study for obtaining a good embedding matrix 
is discussed in the following. 
The AWD-LSTM is primarily used for a particular type of data, where both the inputs and outputs 
are sequential. The target task is similar to that of language modeling in NLP, where we predict the 
next word in a sentence given a sequence of input words. Similarly, for the SCs, we train the network 
to predict the next opcode given a sequence of opcodes. A generic AWD-LSTM primarily consists 
of two layers: encoder and decoder (Fig. 1). The encoder consists of some LSTM blocks and learns 
a compact representation of the input, which is later used by the decoder to predict the output. For 
example, if the input is an opcode sequence that contains elements with indices from 1 to 100, the 
output is from the same opcode sequence, which contains elements with indices from 2 to 101 (shifted 
by one index).  
First, we train and validate this ‘regular architecture’ AWD-LSTM with the input and output vectors, 
both having the same length. The length of the input opcode sequence is of variable length. However, 
to achieve multi-class classification, the specific adaptation of the algorithm in this study is 
implemented by replacing the ‘decoder’ layer of AWD-LSTM by some fully connected layers, also 
known as custom head. Needless to point that, the output layer of this block is the same as the total 
number of Types, which is four in this particular study. It is to be noted that, the encoder in first block 
gets trained during the first phase which will act like a pre-trained encoder for the second block 
(classifier). It is better than random initialization, and the networks already contains a lot of semantic 
information about the input data. The high-level idea of the present protocol is to combine a 
pretrained encoder with the ‘custom head’ to obtain a better classification: this is motivated by 
ULMFIT as implemented for the NLP application as articulated in [27]. This modified architecture 
is trained and validated again. There are other neural network architectures such as Transformer, 
which is a form of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) and employ the idea of transfer learning to perfrom 
NLP tasks such as language translation might also be useful. 
 Fig. 1: The architecture of AWD-LSTM used in the present study. Block-A corresponds to the 
Language model-like architecture and Block-B corresponds to the Classification network. Blue 
arrows indicate that the weights of the encoder layer of Block-A are copied to the encoder layer of 
Block-B. The size of input embedding layer is 400. The comprehensive details of this architecture 
can be found in [36] 
 
2.3 Training details 
Out of the total 40,877 opcode combinations available after the pre-processing, as discussed in section 
2.1, we have divided each class types spanning from 1 to 4 (number of SCs belonging to them are 
5801, 1461, 1207, and 32408, respectively) in training, validation and test sets uniformly at the ratio 
of 70:15:15. So the test cases for each types consists of 870, 220, 181, and 4860 respectively totalling 
6131 opcodes. Two neural network blocks (A and B as shown in Fig. 1) are used in the present study. 
The first network is AWD-LSTM, which is trained to predict the next element in an opcode sequence 
given a few elements in that opcode sequence. To avoid overfitting, AWD-LSTM(Block-A)  is 
regularized using various types of dropouts [26] such as (a) Embedding dropout where dropout is 
applied to remove words from the embedding layer for a single epoch which removes the occurrence 
of a specific word within that epoch, (b) Variational dropout, (c) L2 regularization on the weights 
which restricts the weights from getting large in magnitude [details can be found in 26]. The second 
AWD-LSTM (Block-B) network is trained to perform classification.  
 
Fig. 2 (a) Learning rate scheduler for Language model (b) Learning rate scheduler for Classifier 
We used the learning rate scheduler [37] to find the optimal learning rate for the given data set. In 
this process, the learning rate is gradually increased after each mini-batch, and the loss is recorded at 
each increment and loss vs. learning rate is plotted in Fig. 2. For learning rates that are too low, the 
loss decreases at a slower rate, but as we reach the optimal learning rate region, the loss will drop 
quickly (steepest slope). Increasing the learning rate beyond this value may result in overshooting the 
global minima of the loss function. To achieve good results, we train the model with a learning rate 
that corresponds to the point where the loss reduces most steeply for the first few epochs. Figure 2 
indicates that 0.03 is the optimal learning rate for first neural network as well as for the classifier 
network because after this point the slope of the loss curve is very high. Instead of training the whole 
network with a single learning rate, discriminative learning rates are used to train the classifier where 
learning rates lie in the range of (0.0044 to 0.04). Different layers of the network are trained at 
different learning rates since they capture different types of information. Initial layers of the network 
are trained at lower learning rates as compared to later layers of the network. During classification, 
the encoder part of the network is frozen (parameters are not updated) initially for few epochs, and 
only the custom head is fine-tuned. After the elapse of those few epochs, the encoder part is gradually 
unfrozen layer by layer, and the network is trained progressively. Both the networks are trained using 
a one-cycle training policy [37], where the learning rate is high for initial epochs and reduced 
significantly for the last epoch. These techniques help us in achieving better performance and stable 
training, where the parameters are updated at the correct pace. This strategy helps us in taking 
advantage of the knowledge gained from the language model in the form of a pretrained encoder (as 
articulated in the high-level idea mentioned in section 2.2) and helps in obtaining progressively 
smooth training. The code is written in Python using fastai [38] which is an open source platform to 
develop deep learning models. The code is executed in Google Collaboratory which provides K-80 
GPU with 12GB RAM for free to run machine learning algorithms. The Source code and the weights 
of the neural networks used in this study is available here [39]. 
3. RESULTS 
We have studied 40,877 opcodes combinations (type-1 to 4 as 5801, 1461, 1207 and 32408 
respectively) and analyzed the performance of AWD-LSTM method on the given dataset by 
calculating the following metrics: 
Accuracy:  The accuracy of the model is calculated based on the number of the correctly identified 
vulnerability  
 testedTotal
Negatives TruePositives True
Accuracy

                                                                                   (1) 
The accuracy is not always the best metric for defining the usefulness of the model. For example, 
when we have very few positive cases in a huge dataset (class imbalanced dataset), even if the model 
fails to detect any true positive case, the accuracy will remain high (due to the high value of true 
negatives in Eq. 1). Thus we do not rely only on accuracy but also calculate the recall and precision 
scores. 
Recall Score: Recall score tells the ability of a model to find all the relevant or positive cases in the 
given dataset. It is calculated for each class separately. 
Negatives FalsePositives True
Positives True
Recall

                                                                                        (2) 
There is a problem with the recall score, if the model assigns all (or, most of it) the data points as 
positive cases, then the recall score will be one (or, close to one; Eq. 2). Such a situation will lead to 
the impression that we have a near-perfect classifier, though in reality, its performance is very poor. 
To reduce the wrong classification of negative cases, we need a still better metric that maintains the 
trade-off between true positives and false positives. 
Precision Score: Precision is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to the total 
predicted positive observations. 
Positives FalsePositives True
Positives True
Precision

                                                                                    (3) 
Thus while recall score indicates the ability of a model to find the relevant cases, the precision score 
tells the proportion of data points, which are categorised as positive cases are actually positive. So 
from Eqs. (2) and (3), we can see that in a dataset of very few true positives, the recall and precision 
are inversely proportional. If the recall is high, then precision will be low and vice versa. Thus we 
need to find the optimal blend of these two metrics. 
Fbeta Score: Fbeta score is the harmonic mean of the precision and recall and can be expressed by Eq. 
(4).  
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betaF
                                                                                                                                        (4) 
Confusion matrix: Confusion matrix or error matrix also describes the performance of a 
classification model. It is a square matrix of size nn , where n is the number of classes present in 
the dataset. The diagonal elements of the confusion matrix tell the number of correctly classified data 
points of each class, whereas the other elements are the wrongly classified data points. 
 
Weighted average of different metrics 
We also calculated the weighted average (Wm) of different metrics discussed above using Eq. (5) 



cr
i
i
i
m m
N
n
W
1
                                                                                                                                   (5) 
Where, Wm is the weighted metric (recall, precision, and Fbeta score), rc is the number of categories 
(four in the present study), ni is the number of SC of the i
th Type, N is the total number of SC and mi 
is the respective class metric value (un-weighted). 
 
 Fig. 3: Variation of  Fbeta score with epochs.  
In general, the Fbeta score increases during training of the model. The variation of Fbeta score during 
training is shown in Fig. 3. It shows that the model quickly achieve very high Fbeta score (in the second 
epoch itself, while even in the first epoch it is as high  as ~91.1%). The model is trained for 132 
epochs. The Fbeta score curve has fluctuations but overall it increases for higher epochs. 
Table 1: AWD-LSTM detection performance measures. 
Classification 
Performance Measure 
AWD-LSTM (%) 
Class-wise 
AWD-LSTM (%) 
Weighted Average 
Test Accuracy 91.0 (Overall) --- 
 
Recall Score 
74.0 (Type-1)  
91.0 19.0 (Type-2) 
75.0 (Type-3) 
98.0 (Type-4) 
 
Precision Score 
82.0 (Type-1)  
90.0 66.0 (Type-2) 
94.0 (Type-3) 
93.0 (Type-4) 
 
 
Fbeta Score 
78.0 (Type-1)  
 
         90.0 
30.0 (Type-2) 
83.0 (Type-3) 
95.0 (Type-4) 
 Table 1 shows the values of different metrics used for evaluating the performance of AWD-LSTM. 
We achieved a higher weighted average Fbeta score than obtained by [25].     
The diagonal elements of the confusion matrix, C (depicted in Fig. 4), are the correctly classified SCs. 
The elements C1,1, C2,2, C3,3, C4,4, are the number of SCs that are correctly classified as Suicidal, 
Prodigal, Greedy, and normal, respectively. The other elements are miss-classified SCs. The 
confusion matrix depicts that our model in correctly classifying a minimum of 74% for any Type 
except for the Type 2. Therefore, it is clear that the prodigal type of vulnerability (class-2), is evading 
appropriate detection. It is presently unclear, whether this is because of some technical nature of the 
Type-2 vulnerabilities or becase of some kind of weakness in the present scheme. This, therefore 
deserves a thorough  further investigation.    
 
Fig. 4: (a) Confusion matrix for all the four vulnerable categories for the total 6131 opcodes belonging 
to the validation and test sets (for details, see section 2.3). 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, shown in Fig. 5, is the plot between true positive 
rate and false positive rate of predictions from a neural network for various classes studied in this 
article. In the limit of AUC (Area under curve) approaching to one, the model will be close to 
perfection and will indicate near ideal classification. A value closer to 0.5 will indicate detereorating 
performance. The AUC metric (mentioned in the legend in Fig. 5) indicates the neural networks’ 
capability to distinguish between various classes. The best performance is observed for Type-3 
(AUC >99%), while the minimum, which is observed for Type-2 (AUC >98%) is still very good. 
Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that the method proposed in this article for multi-class 
classification of SCs is fairly accurate, acceptable and can provide a foundation for further 
development. 
 Fig. 5: Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve 
Conclusion 
The adaptation of Pre-trained neutral networks is increasing in diverse areas of deep-learning 
applications as they are proven to be useful in achieving better performance in various tasks. It was 
initially used for image classification and is extended to various tasks in NLP. A neural network is 
trained initially on a different target task for which a large amount of data is available. Later, changes 
are made to the neural network architecture by replacing some blocks in the initial network to perform 
the required target task. The high-level idea of the present protocol is to combine a pretrained encoder 
with the ‘custom head’ to obtain a better classification: this is motivated by ULMFIT. We adapted 
this protocol for multi class classification for the SCs. In particular, we used two neural networks 
where the first network learns a significant amount of semantic information about the input data which 
helps the second network to achieve better and quicker performance. We demonstrated that the  
method proposed in this article for multi-class classification of SCs is fairly accurate and produces 
acceptable results with an accuracy of 91.0% and an Fbeta score of 90.0%. Another important metric, 
AUC is also very high (minimum value is in excess of 0.87 for any class), indicating robust 
performance of the present algorithm for the detection of vulnerabilities in the SCs. We also outlined 
the scope and direction for future research for improved performance. 
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